RSA: message encryption using multiple keys

Question

Is it possible to get additional protection by encrypting a message using two or more RSA keys?

EDIT: A few clarifications:

The context that interests me the most is the encryption of a randomly generated symmetric key.

I do not want to limit the encryption issue twice in a row; the goal is to avoid the high computational cost of large RSA keys. The use of less simple tactics, such as splitting a message into parts and encrypting them separately, should be considered as an option.

It should be assumed that receiving only part of the message is acceptable.

If you know of any publications where this is specifically discussed by an expert or algorithms using several RSA keys, please contribute.

Answer 1

No.

If key A is compromised than encrypted with A + B, it will be protected from compromise, but outside this special case you will not get an additional advantage.

Answer 2

No .

It is unsafe to do mental experiments regarding cryptography. You are advised to stay on the path followed by experts.

- , ( 2048 , ) , RSA.

, , . .

- , - promises : RSA Shor, (Grover) (128 64-, ). , , .. ..:)

Answer 3

!

. RSA. , ( ), , . n , n-1 , . .

RSA. , n m , m n, . .

, : http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Shared_secret

Answer 4

, . , . RSA mod , . . , . , , , , , .

Answer 5

, E(M, K), M - , K - . , E .

K1 K2.

, E(E(M, K1), K2), . - E(M, K1), K2 , , E(E(M, K1), KF), KF - , .

. .

The implications are obvious. Assuming that you use correctly composed cryptographic primitives with combinations encryption function:key, if you encrypt every second block with a different key from a set of two keys, an attacker can only decrypt the blocks for which he has a key.