How do you reduce offer overflow attacks in Byzantine Paxos?

Question

I did a lot of research recently at Paxos, and one thing that I have always been interested in is that I don’t see the answers, which means I have to ask.

Paxos includes an increasing proposal number (and possibly also a separate round number, depending on who wrote the document you are reading). And, of course, two potential leaders can get into a duel, where everyone is trying to put the other in a vicious circle. But since I work in a Byzantine P2P environment, that does me what to do with sentences that will try to set the sentence number to extremely high - for example, a maximum 32-bit or 64-bit word.

How should a language agnostic, a platform-agnostic protocol based on Paxos deal with whole maxima for the sentence number and / or round number? Particularly deliberate / malicious cases that make the modular arithmetic approach of overflowing back to 0 a little unattractive?

Answer 1

From what I read, I think this is an open question that is not considered in the literature.

Byzantine Proposer Fast Paxos indicates a denial of service, but only one that delays the sending of messages through attacks not related to flooding with an increase (offer).

, , , . , , ( DoS). , , , "" .

. , (, , ). , . , , , .

, , () . , , / , , . , 100 ( - ), , , .

() , , , (Raft ). , , , , . , - , X , , , , . , , , , "Y ". Ben-Or, , , FLP ( , , , ).

, "" , , , . .

, , . , , ( , ).